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A basic objective of the Faculty Association of Utah State 
University is, in the words of its constitution: 
to encourage intellectual growth and development of its members 
by sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two annual 
faculty research lectures in the fields of (1) the biological and 
exact sciences, including engineering, called the Annual Faculty 
Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences; and (2) the humanities 
and social sciences, including education and business administra-
tion, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Humanities. 
The administration of the University is sympathetic with these 
aims and shares, through the Scholarly Publications Committee, the 
costs of publishing and distributing these lectures. 
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty 
Association. Among the factors considered by the committee in choos-
ing lecturers are, in the words of the constitution: 
(1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2) 
publication of research through recognized channels in the field 
of the proposed lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over an ex-
tended period of years; (4) personal influence in developing the 
character of the students. 
F. Ross Peterson was selected by the committee to deliver the Annual 
Faculty Honor Lecture in the Humanities. On behalf of the members of the 
Association, we are happy to present Professor Peterson's paper. 
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The Teton Dam Disaster: 
Tragedy or Triumph? 
by 
F. Ross Peterson * 
Six years ago, Charles Peterson and I received a carefully 
wrapped manuscript in the mail. An enclosed letter described in 
graphic detail the story of the water-stained box and its contents. The 
letter was from a graduate student who lived and taught in Sugar, 
. Idaho. This student had written a master's thesis of questionable 
merit, and we had rejected it in 1975 and had demanded a complete 
rewrite. The disgruntled and discouraged author had placed the 
ill-fated work in a box on the desk in his study. It remained there for 
nearly one year. Then onJune 5, 1976, the Teton Dam collapsed. The 
surging wall of water and collected debris swept the student's house 
away and decimated the contents. The desk, upon which the thesis 
rested, was never located, but three weeks later, the student was star-
tled when a man drove into his driveway and presented the manuscript 
box and its water-damaged pages. The man had found the box five 
miles away on an irrigation ditch bank. Our student resubmitted the 
thesis, water marks and all, with the implied challenge, "Obviously, 
God wanted this story told or this too would have been destroyed!" 
Who were we to reject God's handiwork? 
Sometime later, I read an item in the Logan HeraldJournal that 
quickened my interest again. In her column "Through the Garden 
Gate," Cleta Hansen reported that when the flood waters receded, 
many people feared that the remaining ponds, pools, and stagnant 
water would become the breeding ground for mosquitoes. According 
to Hansen, similar to what happened in pioneer Utah, thousands of 
sea gulls flew in from the southwest, settled on the water, gorged 
themselves with larvae, and the summer of 1976 was relatively 
mosquito-free. 
·Professor, Department of History and Geography 
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These two related events convinced me that to many the Teton 
Dam collapse was not just an ordinary disaster. It is true that dams 
had failed previously and that many more lives had been lost. The 
1972 collapse of the dam on Buffalo Creek in West Virginia certainly 
was more destructive of life as was the 1928 failure of the St. Francis 
Dam on the Santa Clara River in California. 1 
However a closer study of the Teton Dam illustrates a number of 
unique considerations about this particular dam's demise. The exam-
ination prompted the question of whether or not this was a tragedy or 
a triumph. Since the ill-fated dam was a Bureau of Reclamation pro-
ject, this was a genuine federally funded disaster. Ultimately, the 
government assumed full responsibility for personal and property 
losses. A claims office was established, and all involved had to file a 
claim categorizing and evaluating their losses. This process tested the 
basic honesty of the individuals and also hastened a rush to judgment 
that made it impossible to assess long-range damage, especially to the 
land. 
Another unique feature of this disaster was that nearly 95 percent 
of the affected people belonged to the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints (LDS) or Mormons. The similar religious beliefs of 
the valley residents created an immediate folklore of premonitions, 
miracles, and divine intervention. Another difference about this 
disaster was the fantastic volunteer labor force that literally invaded 
the area immediately after the collapse of the dam. In an unpre-
cedented manner, over forty thousand volunteers performed clean-up 
work. Friends, relatives, neighbors, coreligionists, and total strangers 
came into the valley and worked under the direction of federal , state, 
local, and church authorities. 
The Association for the Humanities in Idaho and the Kellogg 
Foundation funded a massive oral history project administered by 
Utah State University and Ricks College. During the summer of 1977, 
one year after the disaster, approximately four hundred interviews 
were conducted by trained historians. These edited transcripts are the 
primary sources for this lecture as well as for a book -length study of 
the Teton Dam disaster. It must be remembered that oral histories are 
only one type of source and they must be subjected to close scrutiny. 
Every interviewee wants to be recorded positively; therefore, the 
transcripts have to be examined for patterns, trends, similarities, and 
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rare occurrences in an effort to obtain historical objectivity. Even with 
this qualification, however, the oral interviews are a valuable source in 
documenting human reactions, feelings, and attitudes about the 
disaster. 
In order to understand why a dam of the magnitude of the Teton 
failed, it is essential to place that particular project in a historical con-
text. In an age of technological achievement with profound faith in 
the human ability to control nature, a man-made disaster assumes 
unique dimensions. It is necessary to analyze what was done wrong 
and why those mistakes were permitted. This is not done to single out 
individuals who contributed to the whole, but to show how pressure 
groups, politicians, and the ever-present pursuit of prosperity contri-
buted to the ultimate failure of the Teton Dam. When people viewed 
the tremendous, and in some instances, total destruction, some ques-
tioned the very foundation upon which Rocky Mountain agriculture is 
based-irrigation and man-made dams. Believers in the Ten Com-
mandments, the Mormon occupants of the valley were taught to "put 
no other gods before Me." Yet, for much of their history, these hard-
working farmers viewed water as deity. In the late nineteenth century, 
their progenitors settled the Upper Snake River Valley, where water 
was and is their economic lifeblood. They fasted and prayed for it, 
pleaded for the right amount, and exhausted any means to guarantee 
its reliability. A poem recited in one of the oral histories documents 
this point. 
In the Land of Irrigation, 
where the desert blossoms, as a rose. 
There dwells a knight in armor, 
who everyone loves that knows. 
He guides the little streamlets, 
to the famished stems and roots. 
He carries life on his shovel, 
the man in the rubber boots. 
He doesn't write great sermons, 
nor argue points at court. 
He doesn't rush to battle, 
and he has not time for sport. 
But just to be nearer to nature, 
he leaves all other pursuits, 
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he spends his life out in the open, 
deep in his rubber boots. 
The river out in the valley, 
where men have scarcely trod , 
keeps calling, calling to him, 
to till her fertile sod. 
And the song of the river is music to him, 
as he cries for recruits. 
So, he hurries away to her service, 
shod in his rubber boots . 
Sometimes when we quit shouting, 
of bravery in battle's flame, 
of Lus£tan£a victims and those lost on the Ma£ne, 
perhaps we'll sing some praises to him, 
who reaped no fruits , 
but made the West an Eden, 
by toiling in rubber boots. Z 
Now one of their beloved dams had failed and unleashed a horrendous 
wave of destruction and once again proved that water controlled the 
lives of these peculiar people. 
The Teton River flows less than eighty miles before it merges with 
Henry's Fork of the Snake River. With headwaters on the western 
slopes of the Teton Mountains, the trout-filled stream meanders 
northward through the beautiful Teton Valley before turning west. 
The westward course plunges through a canyon that is more than 
twenty miles long. Although there were some small diversion dams, 
the Teton was, prior to 1974, a free-flowing stream subject to fast 
thaws. The very fact that it flowed freely through rich potato-
producing farmland meant that farmers coveted its water for both 
irrigation and flood control. 
Irrigation is a way of life in the arid mountain west. The annual 
precipitation in the Upper Snake Valley is less than twenty inches and 
most of that comes as snowfall. Consequently, if the spring runoff is 
not controlled, it is lost forever to some downstream user. There is 
usually a shortage of water, except when warm early spring weather 
brings floods. This leads to the ironic reality of a drought-and-flood 
cycle. Land, close to the river, might flood in May yet the crops might 
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die a thirsty death in August. That was, and in some areas still is , the 
reality of farming in the dry Rocky Mountain states. 
In the 1880s, Mormon settlers made their way into the Upper 
Snake River Valley. As in other arid communities settled by the Mor-
mons, farmers organized irrigation districts or companies based on the 
concept of prior appropriation. Everyone in the district was allotted so 
many hours of water spaced throughout the summer. They com-
munally maintained the company canal and individually dug the 
ditches. For those close to the river, the opportunitites for success were 
certainly better because of the water's proximity. Still, there was no 
guarantee that the desperately needed water would be there during 
the hot months of August and September. 
In 1902, the federal government entered the picture and began to 
offer alternatives in the West. The Newlands Act created a Bureau of 
Reclamation to encourage the agrarian development of the western 
United States. The Bureau worked diligently to provide irrigation for 
nearly ten million acres in the seventeen western states where it had 
authority. The Bureau also had responsibilities beyond irrigation 
including industrial water service, hydroelectric power, flood control, 
recreation , wildlife and fish enhancement, and even weather 
modification. However, the Bureau's main business was to build 
multipurpose dams to provide irrigation water. 
Theoretically, the farmers who receive the water are supposed to 
repay the cost through increased production, hence, an ability to pay 
more taxes. In reality, irrigation district officials join with Bureau 
representatives and congressmen in seeking authorization for new 
dams and auxiliary projects. As long as the nation's taxpayers pick up 
the immediate bill, then the pork-barrel projects roll through Con-
gress. Most western farmers are appalled by welfare costs in urban 
areas, yet, ironically, federal dollars have provided them with their 
economic lifeblood, water. Until June of 1976, the Bureau of 
Reclamation had a nearly perfect dam construction record, with only 
the Fontenelle Dam in Wyoming threatening to collapse. After 
seventy-five years of dam building, the professional Bureau engineers 
and geologists, as well as experienced construction companies, knew 
how to build a dam. Their only real mandates were to show a cost effi-
ciency ratio and, since 1969, to issue a detailed environmental impact 
statement. 
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As early as 1903, the Bureau investigated the Teton River as a 
potential dam site. In 1962 following a mid-winter flood, the farmers 
of the Fremont-Madison Irrigation District sought a federally fi-
nanced Bureau dam. It took seven years for the project to gain appro-
val and the necessary appropriations. During the Vietnam War years, 
funding for domestic projects was difficult , and the fact that 
Representative Ralph Harding, who spearheaded congressional 
authorization, was defeated in 1964 hurt the dam's chances for 
money. In 1969, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was 
authorized and a Teton dam environmental impact statement was 
required of the Bureau. The fourteen-page draft of the impact state-
ment was circulated in early 1971 to any interested citizen or agency. 
Immediate conflict erupted between supporters of the dam and a new 
breed of westerner, the environmentalist. 
The statement concisely summarized the purpose of the dam and 
estimated the cost at fifty-eight million dollars. Without emotion, the 
Bureau conceded that the new reservoir would inundate seventeen 
miles of canyon and destroy the native cutthroat trout population. 
According to the brief study, much of the winter forage ground that 
supported elk and deer herds as well as other animal life would be 
eliminated. However, the study stated that the positive aspects far 
outweighed the negative. The statement concluded by asking the 
Bureau to consider three alternatives to the proposal: (1) control 
floods by constructing a series of levees (which the Army Corps of 
Engineers had investigated in the 1950s); (2) pump groundwater to 
supply additional irrigation water; and (3) leave it alone. The reports 
ignored any possible seismic dangers, engineering problems, or 
geological difficulties. After reviewing the EPA report, the Bureau 
implemented its original plan and sought bids for the dam. 
This decision was not reached without considerable research and 
investigation. As the Bureau learned more of the Teton Canyon in the 
1960s, they discovered several potential problems. As early as 1961 
and again in 1963, researchers warned that a reservoir might leak, but 
these warnings were not included in any of the congressional hearings. 
The project was authorized prior to the test-well drilling and prior to 
the excavation that revealed extensive fissures throughout the canyon 
wall. 
By 1969, some Bureau officials questioned the feasibility of the 
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project . An additional two hundred thousand dollars was appro-
priated to study if normal methods of sealing the foundation and the 
walls would be feasible at the Teton Dam. The engineers utilized a 
technique known as grouting. They drilled several holes in the canyon 
wall and then poured grout (a mixture of cement, sand, and water) 
into the holes. When the hole was filled, the grout remained and 
hardened. Theoretically, this method should keep the fissures from 
leaking. After the grouting tests, however, some geologists had serious 
doubts about whether this method would work. Clifford Oteson wrote 
that because so much grout was poured into the holes without filling 
them, he had grave questions about the water-holding capabilities of 
the reservoir. Another geologist, Shirley Pytlak, described a similar 
test . Instead of grout, an average of 300 gallons of water per minute 
was pumped into the holes. The holes simply did not fill. Conse-
quently, the Bureau decided to include key trenches. Seventy-foot-
deep key trenches were dug under and on each side of the dam. Grout 
holes were drilled, filled with grout, and then clay was packed into the 
trenches. Ideally, three grout curtains would prevent leakage into the 
fissures . 
The Bureau should have studied its recent past more closely. The 
Fontenelle Dam in Wyoming was saved in 1965 because its auxiliary 
outlets were operating and after the reservoir was drained, eight grout 
curtains were added to the original two. A few months after the trench 
decision was reached, Oteson reported that the problem was not 
solved. Although eight million gallons of water was pumped into one 
hole over a period of two weeks, the hole was never filled. 3 
In 1972 , amidst a series of court battles in which environmentalists 
were often branded as extremists, actual construction of the dam 
began. Not long after initial excavation started, U.S. Geological 
Survey scientists raised more objections to the chosen site. Dr. David 
Schleicher expressed deep concern over the seismic risk potential in 
the area. Schleicher felt that the Bureau's engineers had failed to con-
sider the significant earthquake possibilities in southeastern Idaho. 
Schleicher also argued that the chances for slumping and sliding 
would increase because of the nature of the rock and soil around the 
dam. In April, Schleicher and some of his associates wrote to Robert 
Robison, the project engineer, and warned that many fault lines 
crossed the area of the dam site. They suggested that it was likely that 
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an earthquake would destroy the dam if the design were not altered. 
Interestingly, Robison never received the original letter. It was turned 
into a bureaucratic "preliminary report, " and the language lost its 
urgency after editing. In its final form , it was not a warning at all. 
The Bureau did install seismographs, but no earthquake activity was 
reported during the period of dam construction.' 
A more serious problem arose as several large fissures began to 
appear, most of them inside the north canyon wall . Some of the cracks 
were large enough for a person to walk into the bottom of the key 
trench. One three-by-five foot opening expanded into a cavern nearly 
forty feet high. Another ten-foot-high fissure extended for approx-
imately seventy-five feet. These numerous cracks and caverns caused 
the project engineer and the construction company engineers to stop 
and to analyze the situation. After extensive surveying of the fissures 
and repeated delays, the engineers agreed to treat the fissure zones to 
make them "watertight. " That meant pouring more and more grout 
into the holes. As construction progressed, large fissures continued to 
appear. When an eight-inch-wide fissure was discovered about twenty 
feet from the spillway area, it required 33 ,000 cubic feet of grout to 
fill it. That is enough cement to form a concrete block eleven feet high 
by thirty feet wide and one hundred feet long. Ultimately, 575,000 
cubic feet of grout was dumped into the fissures and holes surrounding 
the Teton Dam. That was more than twice as much as the original 
estimate to fill the key trenches and the grout curtains. 5 
In the summer of 1975 , two Bureau geologists warned that the 
numerous caverns and fissures in the canyon walls posed potential 
hazards to the welfare of the dam. Robert J. Farina and H. H. Ham 
feared that the north canyon abutment simply would not stand up to 
rapid leakage. After they were shown the final design, which included 
the plans for the three grout curtains, these critics were satisfied that 
seepage of that volume would never occur. 
When the grouting was completed, Bureau officials drilled test 
wells on both sides of the grout curtains. Water was then pumped 
under pressure into the upstream wells while the wells located 
downstream were monitored for water seepage. Bureau officials, 
Robison and Rod Vissia , the regional director, both testified that the 
water did not seep through the grout curtains. By the fall of 1975, the 
Bureau was ready to start filling the new dam. Brochures were 
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prepared to advertise the multifaceted benefits of the new earth-fill 
dam, and a scenic outlook on the south rim of the canyon was com-
pleted. On October 3, 1975, with the river at its lowest, the reservoir 
began to fill slowly. 
The dam was nearing completion as the water began to climb the 
canyon walls upstream. At its base, the gigantic earth-fill structure 
was 1,690 feet thick. From its foundation, it rose to a height of 305 
feet. The crest was 35 feet wide and 3,050 feet long. Between the foun-
dation and the crest was 9.5 million cubic yards of compacted clay, 
silt, sand, gravel, and rockfill. Behind this great dam was to be a 
reservoir 17 miles long, with a capacity to store nearly 290,000 acre 
feet of water, or 80 billion gallons. On paper it looked like another 
grand achievement: supplemental irrigation for 111 ,000 acres; power 
to produce 20 ,000 kilowatts; no more floods; 7,500 acres of newly 
accessible recreation land; and 2,100 acres for fish and wildlife 
development. As the spring of 1976 approached, even the skeptics 
were prepared to make the best of the situation. 
Considering all of the difficulties encountered during construc-
tion, it is amazing that in March, 1976, project engineer Robison 
sought permission to exceed the one-foot-per-day limit of filling the 
dam set by the dam's designers. The mountains where the Teton's 
headwaters are located had a greater snowpack than average that 
year. Most of the construction was finished, and the outlet tunnel was 
scheduled for completion on May 1. The engineers viewed the heavy 
snows as an opportunity to fill the reservoir earlier than the 1977 com-
pletion date. This would enable them to test the power turbines in the 
electrical plant, clear debris from the reservoir , and observe the effec-
tiveness of the grout curtains. 
Unfortunately, problems continued to surface. I:q. April, the 
Bureau determined that 4.8 billion gallons of Teton Reservoir water 
was leaking somewhere, somehow. After determining that the leakage 
was probably a result of filling the dam, the Bureau scrapped an 
elaborate proposal to find out where the water was going. Adding to 
the uncertainty, other Bureau officials warned in early April that the 
water table on the north side of the reservoir was rising nearly 100 
times the predicted rate. Still, Harold Arthur, the Bureau's director in 
Denver, gave the order to double the rate of filling the dam. Arthur, 
who was to lose his job and become in his words, "the scapegoat," 
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knew that the water table was rising, but he felt that it was a normal 
development. By early June, the water rose at the rate of four feet a 
day (twice the authorized level) and the groundwater in the testing 
wells increased at a rate of seven feet per day. 
Bureau officials in Boise or Denver were not informed of the sud-
den elevation of the groundwater. The Bureau chief of earth dams, 
Richard Bock, said that the unfinished water tunnel would have been 
opened as a safety measure if he had known. Arthur's predecessor, D. 
P. Bellport, wrote after the Fontenelle experience in Wyoming, that 
where unfavorable foundation conditions existed, it was necessary to 
fill the r~servoir in a slow, controlled manner. Another expert main-
tained, however, that the rate of filling and the dam failure may not 
have been related. 
In fact, as things developed, the Bureau had no recourse but to let 
the dam fill at nature's pace. The outlet tunnel , designed to remove 
water from the reservoir, was not finished by the contracted May 1 
deadline. Workmen were inside the tunnel preparing it for final 
inspection the very morning the dam collapsed. Although the auxil-
iary outlet tunnel was in operation, its capacity was limited. It could 
not let water out at a fast enough rate to affect the rapid filling of the 
dam. 
The Bureau felt secure as the month of June arrived. No leaks 
appeared, the rapidly filling reservoir neared its capacity, the outlet 
tunnel was almost waterproofed, and the total project was over 90 
percent completed. From the final report of the U.S. Department of 
the Interior Dam Failure Review group, an accurate chronology of the 
first week of June can be reconstructed. The false feeling of security 
was destroyed that first week in June as two leaks appeared below the 
dam on the north canyon wall . The early leaks, evident on June 3, 
were like springs of clear water. These two small leaks were located 
1,300 and 1,500 feet downstream from the toe of the dam. When 
measured by officials, it was estimated that approximately forty to 
sixty gallons per minute was seeping out of each leak. The next day, 
Friday, June 4, a small clear leak, flowing approximately twenty 
gallons per minute, was located only 150 feet from the toe of the dam. 
All of the apparent leaks were near the wall of the north canyon. 
In a memo to his superiors, Robison told them that a new spring had 
developed. He reported the earlier leaks were still flowing at the com-
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bined rate of 100 gallons per minute. Robison promised to keep Harry 
Arthur "advised" of the situation. Arthur was "advised" long before 
the memo reached his office. The next day was June 5. 6 
No additional problems were recorded on June 4. No leaks 
appeared either on the dam's embankment or on the actual abutment. 
The last Bureau official left at 12:30 a.m. on June 5. Although the 
next morning was a Saturday, a group of contract personnel and 
Bureau surveyors were at the project shortly after 7:00 a.m. A few 
minutes later, they observed two leaks on the right abutment of the 
dam. Turbid water was pouring from both leaks and an erosion chan-
nel was apparent near the base of the dam. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., 
Robison and other engineers were notified. Five hours after the first 
observed embankment leaks appeared on the dam's north side, it 
totally collapsed. Only fifteen hours elapsed between the last close 
inspection on Friday evening, when no leaks were visible, until the 
dam failed. 
Within a few hours, the flood had run its course to the Snake River 
and down to the American Falls Reservoir. Over 100,000 acres of 
farmland were affected and over 13,000 livestock were lost. Millions of 
dollars worth of farm equipment was destroyed. At least 250 
businesses were rendered inoperable. Approximately 733 homes were 
obliterated and 3,000 damaged. Many of the damaged homes were 
later demolished. The initial estimate of the losses was placed at one 
billion dollars. More importantly, six people drowned in the flood and 
five others died in flood-related incidents. 7 
How all of this affected the residents of the valley is significant. All 
dislocated individuals related their feelings concerning the losses, and 
they tried to explain what the disaster meant and what they exper-
ienced as they returned to the flooded area. Again, the great dif-
ference with the Teton flood is that since there were so few deaths, 
community grief centered on lost possessions rather than individuals. 
Because of their religious convictions, many people tried to 
explain the failure of the dam in supernatural terms. In other words, 
why did the Lord let it happen? As they analyzed the hours before the 
flood, some felt they had been warned by a premonition. Others felt 
that miraculous events had accompanied the flood. To many, the 
entire disaster became an intense spiritual experience. Numerous 
examples of premonitions and miracles were told and retold, and a 
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distinct folklore of the Teton Dam disaster has emerged and continues 
to develop. 
Many individuals reported dreaming about the disaster prior to its 
occurrence. 
The miraculous thing to me was that this had been a rerun. Years 
ago I had seen all this happening in a dream. I was up on a hill and 
something was happening. I couldn't tell what it was. Even the 
church house was ruined. The whole horrible feeling came back to 
me. While I was standing on the hill and saw what was happening, 
the dream came back again .8 
Another similar experience was recorded as follows: 
One evening, one night , I had a dream. I guess you know I do write 
some poetry and I wrote in poetic form the experience. I gave a copy 
of this to one of our colleagues .... We read it together .... In fact , it 
was kind of interesting because I was in a position of some official 
capacity, it seemed in at least two instances in the dream. As it 
revealed in the poem, one was a church responsibility ... and the other 
was a civil responsibility which I didn't hold until after the collapse of 
the dam. I read the poem after I had finished writing it and to be 
truthful, I didn't know what it was talking about. It was not until 
sometime after the collapse of the dam ... when I finally recognized 
what ... 1 had written ... had actually occurred.9 
Other premonitions were quite different. One pattern that 
developed was the premonition on Friday or Saturday morning to 
obtain more than normal amounts of cash. Money became very 
important because most of the local banks were going to be closed for 
a long time. The following four examples document this type of 
concern: 
It was a strange thing .. . my one daughter and myself were the only 
ones at home. I'd been working out in the yard and when she got up a 
little later, I said, "Oh, let's run over to Rexburg and have a bit of 
breakfast. " When we got there, I said, "By golly, I've got to get a 
check cashed becauseJ.B.'s won't cash a check." When I went to get 
a check cashed instead of cashing one for maybe $10.00 , I cashed one 
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for $50.00 . 1 never knew why ... because it's not a habit to do that. 1 
had $50.00 in my purse and we went to breakfast and we got back 
home around 10:00 in the morning and 1 hadn't taken my purse out 
of the car. 1 always take it out, but 1 didn't. We went back out in the 
yard and worked and we were working there when they came and 
told us about the flood . 1 just jumped in the car. So 1 had some 
money. It's always been strange to me. 1 thought there must have 
been some reason why 1 wrote that check. 10 
Another man had a similar experience with cash. 
1 had $300.00 in cash but 1 don't even know why. Now here's 
something that's interesting and 1 had been putting that away, just 
not putting it in the bank or anything ... 1 had it downstairs where it 
never would have been found again. Something said, just take that 
$300 .00 in cash. So 1 took it up to my mother's and put it in a drawer 
up there . . . 1 just reached over just before 1 left and took that and put 
it in my wallet. II 
And finally, 
... a neighbor the day before had withdrawn $1,300 from the bank 
because his brother was coming up and they were remodeling their 
house. He felt he needed the cash to get the materials he needed. 
They placed the money in a tin box on their kitchen table and drove 
away and left it; came back and it was gone. People found it blocks 
away and returned it to them. 1% 
This example highlights both the availability of cash and the 
phenomenon of lost items being returned to their rightful owners. 
Another person had a similar experience. 
We were out of town when the flood occurred. On Monday when we 
returned, our son, Doug, went out to see if we had any mail. Big joke! 
The mailbox was lying in the gutter with a big log from the timber 
yard on top of it. The door was open and the whole dam full of water 
had flowed over it. Doug went out and looked anyway and, surprise! 
13 
There was a little batch of mail; the A berdeen Times, some letters 
and wonder of wonders, one from Vicki, our missionary in Italy. The 
flap was unglued, lying open, but the letter was still inside and was 
still readablel We all sat down, read it , then went back to work. Doug 
said the little hook on the mailbox door caught the mail and it was 
still hanging there when he went for it . 
The next day I decided to sort through the rest of it and get rid of the 
muddy mess . On top was what looked like a buy-through-the-mail 
insurance advertisement. I nearly threw it out, but decided to open 
it. Inside were two checks totalling over $1 ,500 to pay on the surgery 
I had in March. 13 
However, not everyone was so fortunate and most people were 
cashless and left at the mercy of the various governmental and church 
agencies. Some, however, had no premonitions of disaster and had 
money. Others had plenty of money, but lost it. One man had sold his 
pigs at an auction on Friday. He cashed the check for $3,500 and left 
it in his pants hanging over a chair. In the morning, he put on 
coveralls and went to deliver fertilizer. He was gone when the water 
destroyed his house in Wilford_ For three weeks after the flood, he 
searched from one end of the valley to the other. He found four pairs 
of jeans the same size and brand name of those lost, and he even found 
his down vest which was on the chair with the pants. The vest had a 
one dollar bill in the pocket, but the $3,500 was lost forever. 14 
A Sugar City family reported a different type of premonition. 
We had been on a trip for about thirty days to our daughter's wed-
ding down in Los Angeles . On the way back, we stopped in Nevada 
where the road takes off going to Salt Lake and up to Twin Falls. We 
stopped there and slept for an hour. We were debating as to whether 
to go to Salt Lake and up through Utah and visit our family and be 
home on Sunday, or whether to come right straight through. We 
went to sleep and I woke up a couple of hours later and thought to 
myself, we ought to be home. There are things to do . I turned the car 
towards Sugar City. We were home about forty minutes before the 
flood broke. We pulled into the back of the house and unloaded the 
suitcases out of the car. The first time we had done that in years, 
unloaded the car . . . 15 
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This family rescued a bedridden father and left their home. Their 
house was totally destroyed and the suitcases were never recovered. 
It is interesting to examine the reported premonitions that in-
volved other issues than just the flood and disaster. One elderly couple 
had been asked to go on a LDS mission. They described their 
premonition: 
We had a feeling that something was going to happen and we might 
not be able to go. We thought maybe it would be some misfortune 
that would happen in the family ... 1 had a feeling something bad was 
going to happen. 1 figured maybe it was going to be one of us that 
would pass away or get awfully sick and we wouldn't be able to go. 
For quite a while, every afternoon, I'd go out and walk around the 
yard and look it all over and wonder why 1 was doing that every day. 
It must have been that 1 knew something was going to happen to it; 
that it wouldn't be there long. 16 
All of these premonitions illustrate that numerous people felt that 
there had been a type of divine intervention on their behalf. The 
warnings of impending disaster or disruption came in a variety of 
ways, but the recipients, given time to contemplate the events of that 
week inJune, were sure that they had been warned. 
The idea of divine intervention did not end with the premonitions. 
The oral histories are filled with stories of miraculous events that sur-
rounded the flood. Although some individuals discussed events that 
transpired during the flood, most were concerned with the preserva-
tion of important personal items. Many women discussed the loss and 
subsequent discovery of their rings. Other people were concerned 
about valuable books, clothing, or material items. However, most 
interviewed were concerned about their genealogical records, photo 
albums, and other family documents. 
The following examples are used to illustrate this concern of the 
flood victims. After describing the impact of returning to their mud 
and manure-filled house, one woman said she wished her house was 
gone because it was "so ugly and stinky and nothing was where it 
should be." She continued: 
Of course, there was one reason that 1 hoped and that was because of 
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our pictures and our genealogy . ... about all 1 could think about that 
night was 1 hope these pictures are still there ... 1 think it [the water] 
got within about six inches of my treasured picture book and of my 
genealogy .... There was only one thing in the front room that was sit-
ting on the floor when the flood hit and was still intact. That was 
Lyle's genealogy book. It was on a little chord organ bench and 
evidently floated up and just sat gently back down. That was the only 
clean thing in the whole front room. 17 
Another family had their genealogy spread out on a bed. When 
the water came into the house, the mattress floated up and then 
settled back onto the silt with all of the records intact. 
One Sugar City family described the flood's impact on their house 
in such a way that the preservation of the genealogical records was 
described as miraculous. The woman said the water went right 
through their home and took with it a baby grand piano, books, 
stereo, couches, beds, silver, china, crystal, tapestries-"everything 
was just gone. We never did see it. " 
She explained by noting: 
We were really concerned about our genealogy. We had it in a big 
pasteboard file box in our family room .... Of course that was one of 
the things 1 really wanted to save because 1 had histories of our peo-
ple and pictures, many hundreds and hundreds of pictures and 
things that were really precious to us. When we went in ... they were 
just nothing but a chunk of mud. But we took them, that box, and 
carried it carefully, so it wouldn't fall to pieces, into the pickup .... 1 
spent all Sunday night washing every page and every picture that was 
in that file box, washing the mud off of it. 1 filled a double garage 
and three rooms . .. with these washings ... the writing is legible and the 
pictures came out pretty well . So we feel that was miraculous. 18 
One more instance illustrates that the victims lost some things but 
had others preserved. One couple lost all of their wedding pictures, 
certificates, diplomas, and other documents because they were in a 
cedar chest in a basement. All of the contents were ruined. The hus-
band had brought his genealogy home shortly before the flood. 
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We thought it was gone, but do you know that two months ago he 
discovered it in his office. You ask if there was anything miraculous, 
now 1 don't know, but he can't remember and 1 cannot remember, 
and 1 know that the first thing he said to me when we went back was, 
"I brought my genealogy home two days before the flood." She con-
tinued, "He cannot remember ever having taken it back and 1 cannot 
remember that he ever did either. ... We are sure that that genealogy 
was right in that house when the flood hit. 19 
Naturally, not everyone was so fortunate . Many people lost all of 
their records in the flood , but others found them and then lost them. 
Our next door neighbor came running up while the flooding was still 
about to your hips. He had taken his boots and gone down to get his 
wedding book. He had just been married about a month ... and he 
had the wedding book with all his wedding pictures and was so 
thrilled 'cause it didn't get hurt in the flood. He stepped in a hole and 
went down, clear down when he fell, and just got those pictures 
ruined.fo 
The very fact that all people involved in the flood did not exper-
ience miracles or did not have premonitions caused considerable con-
cern. Many flood victims felt that they were as worthy and deserving as 
the person who testified of a miraculous event, yet they had not exper-
ienced anything special. This concern caused individuals to seek God's 
involvement in other ways. Most people did feel that they had 
benefited from divine intervention especially concerning the actual 
collapse of the dam. 
Numerous individuals interviewed had strong opinions about why 
God had allowed the dam to collapse and about why the disaster had 
evolved in the manner it did. These people felt the Lord could have 
prevented the destruction, but instead of doing that He had orches-
trated the events of June 5. A year after the disaster, a type of consen-
sus on this issue evolved. Three oral histories summed it up well. 
1 think the Lord was in on it from the beginning. 1 really fed that the 
Lord has used this flood for His own purposes, and 1 also feel that the 
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Lord was holding the dam together until Saturday afternoon because 
it started leaking Thursday and it became apparent, at least to some 
people, that it was going to break. And if it had broken any other 
time, it would have been much worse . I don't think that He could 
have picked a better time than 12:00 noon on Saturday.Zl 
Another individual responded similarly. 
I felt like the timing on it, the fact that it was a Saturday, and that it 
could have happened many different times than that. Maybe the 
water could have backed up and it happened in the middle of the 
winter or maybe a school day. I think maybe there was a divine hand 
in the timing of it. 22 
A third example documents the general feeling. 
I feel the timing of the break was miraculous because if it had been in 
the winter or at night , we would have lost a lot more lives. If the 
whole total dam ... had crumbled away, we wouldn't have a com-
munity or people in it. They couldn't have escaped. It would have 
come so fast and so deep. That's where I feel the divine intervention 
is. %5 
The interviewed victims of the disaster are probably correct in assum-
ing that if the dam had collapsed at night, during the week, or in the 
winter, the human loss would have been much greater. They are also 
probably right in assuming that if the dam had gone completely, 
devastation would have been total. 
There is another aspect of divine intervention that many inter-
viewees discussed. It was their opinion that the dam was allowed to 
collapse to test the LDS people and the welfare system of their church. 
And many felt that the Upper Snake River Valley was a perfect site for 
such a test. Ricks College, a LDS-owned junior college, was there. 
With its thousands of dormitory rooms and adjacent apartments, few 
flood victims lacked shelter. The college's food service storehouse was 
well stocked, and when quickly supplemented by the LDS church, few 
were without food. Within this setting, it was fairly easy to see if the 
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family self-help and church-operated welfare system would and could 
work. The result was, for the most part, successful. 
Another unique aspect of this particular disaster was the coor-
dinated clean-up effort. Within hours after the flood, both Idaho 
Governor Cecil B. Andrus and President Gerald Ford declared the 
flood area a disaster. This meant that federal and state agencies and 
resources could be utilized. U The Federal Disaster Assistance Ad-
ministration (FDAA), Red Cross, and Idaho National Guard as well as 
other federal agencies such as the Small Business Administration, the 
Bureau of Reclamation, the Soil Conservation Service, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Army 
Corps of Engineers moved in quickly. Numerous divisions of state 
government such as Health and Welfare, Public Works, Employment, 
and Highways were also involved. These agencies contained several 
disaster experts, and they were unanimous in their conclusion that 
never had a clean-up effort gone so smoothly. One reason for the com-
parative ease was the immediate marriage of church and state. 
General James Brooks, Idaho's Director of Disaster Services, explain-
ed, "The church organization functioned marvelously under these 
kinds of conditions, and I'd have to say more effectively than most 
anything I've seen. "zs 
The federal and state officials recognized very quickly that the 
church leaders and the local government leaders in the area were 
usually the same people. The agencies also learned that the highly 
organized LDS church could do much of the day-to-day accounting 
for the individual needs of the victims. This left the government agen-
cies free to work on restoring transportation, electricity, and commun-
ication lines. The presence of Ricks College negated the immediate 
need for housing and food, so the FDAA worked on the larger 
problems. 
The Red Cross established headquarters in the Ricks fieldhouse. 
The day after the flood, at a church conducted general meeting, Red 
Cross officials outlined their services. Included in the program were 
survival kits, cleaning supplies, and certificates redeemable in food 
and clothing. The food stamp program of the federal government also 
provided a way to obtain food. Although some LDS people were con-
fused by their church's teachings that they should avoid public 
welfare, many LDS church leaders took the position that the 
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federal government was responsible. It was the Bureau of Reclama-
tion's dam, so the victims should take federal assistance. Finally, the 
First Presidency of the LDS Church advised their people to accept 
loans and other assistance for rebuilding but to use church sources for 
food, clothing, and other necessities.26 In addition, during all of these 
discussions, meetings, and decisions, local Protestant and Catholic 
clergymen had access to all LDS facilities and supplies. 
Perhaps the most amazing story of the clean-up effort concerns the 
approximately forty thousand volunteers who made their way into the 
area throughout the summer of 1976 to assist first in "mucking out" 
and then in rebuilding. Actually, two different systems evolved for 
obtaining and handling these volunteers. The first , which was utilized 
by Ferron Sondregger of the Rexburg North Stake, was to ask a 
neighboring stake to assist. Each day, he would call the stake 
presidents and give directions for the next day. The helpers were then 
directed throughout the various wards. However, there were more 
volunteers coming on their own and there was a need to coordinate the 
entire effort , so a new program was initiated one week after the flood. 
The call was made to stakes throughout southern Idaho, northern 
Utah, and western Wyoming. Orders were given for so many laborers 
to come each day. These individuals were bused, at their own expense, 
to the disaster area . They were then assigned to wards, and ultimately, 
to individual homes. The volunteers would work eight hours , leave 
and be replaced by another group the next day. These volunteers were 
supplemented by Hutterites from Canada, Mennonites from Aber-
deen, Idaho, and countless friends and relatives. 27 
On Saturday, June 19, nearly five thousand volunteers invaded the 
valley. Twenty thousand had come in the first week of the program. 
During the first week, almost everyone was involved in digging the 
slimy, dark muck out of the houses. The putrid smell permeated the 
entire town. The thousands of cheerful volunteers had a fantastic 
effect on the victims of the flood. Work which would have taken 
weeks was completed in two days. One woman described her feelings, 
" I never wept a tear over the loss of our material things, but when I 
saw and felt the magnitude of the human heart, as it opened to our 
aid, I wept. "28 
After the first week of the coordinated volunteer effort, technicians 
and specialists were needed. For example, electricians were needed to 
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restore power to individual homes. A call was made to the Kaysville, 
Utah, area for 150 electricians, and over 400 ,responded. Several 
brought their own trucks, crews, supplies, and donated it all. One 
electrician described his response to the request, "When I left my 
bishop, he told me if there were any problems, anything that I needed, 
just to remember that the bishop would reimburse me through the fast 
offering fund. I didn't come up here to be reimbursed for anything. 
I've got my truck and my crew and anything that needs to be done 
we'll do it, and we'll donate it and be happy to do it. "29 
Another urgent need was for front-end loaders. The Soda Springs 
region was asked to supply six and they responded that they were 
thinking in terms of more than one hundred. 30 One local church 
leader claimed that the volunteers, "literally lifted us up out of the 
mud and set us on our feet again... . Without them we never would 
have made it." Hugh Fowler of the FDAA said that the efforts of both 
the volunteers and the victims speeded up immensely the work of the 
government:3l 
It should be noted that most of the volunteer efforts were concen-
trated on Rexburg and Sugar City, consequently, victims in Wilford 
and Roberts felt somewhat ignored. These two communities were in 
different LDS stakes and were located some distance from Rexburg 
and Ricks College. Since church and government officials in Rexburg 
had the first chance to use the volunteers, they did. Wilford and 
Roberts were also in different counties, and this, too, explained some 
of the negligence. 3% 
Still the impact of the massive summer clean-up effort cannot be 
fully appreciated by those who did not witness its progress. 
Psychologically, the volunteers and the relief agencies created a degree 
of optimism. Some of the elderly victims were so traumatized by their 
losses that they simply gave up and refused to consider starting over. 
Most of the people, however, kept a positive approach and began the 
task of rebuilding. After the release of massive reports on why the dam 
collapsed, the government took full responsibility and agreed to com-
pensate those whose land, machinery, houses, and livestock had been 
damaged or destroyed. Throughout the winter of 1976-77, many peo-
ple sat in HUD trailers and tried to determine their losses. 
The Bureau established an office in Rexburg and sent in experts to 
assist people in filing claims. Once the claim was agreed to, then the 
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government would reimburse the claimant. The government officials 
could approve the claim completely or they could negotiate with the 
claimant. There were very few blatant cases of attempted fraud, but 
the claims process was on the whole very difficult for the victims. They 
were asked to list and value everything lost or destroyed. Some items 
were difficult to evaluate and others were simply irreplaceable. In 
addition, there was no way realistically to assess the damage to the 
soil. Only time would determine that damage. A deadline was 
established for the submission of claims. By the time this procedure 
had run its course, the total cost of the flood's damage was nearly one 
billion dollars. 
Interestingly, very few people would discuss the claims. The inter-
viewees would usually admit to having heard about fraud, but were 
unwilling to be specific, lest their example be identified. 55 Others were 
very disturbed by the haste the Bureau required for submission and 
they were dissatisfied with the settlement. Some individuals went to 
court where they usually lost the litigation. By the winter of 1976-77, 
there were continual public meetings and a growing sense of bitterness 
on the part of those who felt they had been dealt with unjustly. 
Senators Frank Church and James McClure pushed legislation 
through Congress that required the government to pay the claims in a 
lump sum. This created another tremendous problem. There was an 
abundance of cash competing for a shortage of materials and services. 
Consequently, prices rose to horrendous levels. The claim money 
immediately lost much of its face value as the agreed settlement price 
proved inadequate to replace destroyed houses, machinery, livestock, 
and other essentials.5• The valley assumed the posture of a boom town 
for nearly a year. Thousands of homes and barns were constructed or 
repaired. Fences and ditches were replaced. There continued to be a 
shortage of supplies and qualified builders. The result was shoddy 
craftsmanship, less than competent construction, and half-finished 
projects. With the necessary cash on hand, the victims were so anxious 
to repair and replace that often their sound judgment was lost. As one 
person stated, "We settled for less because we wanted to get our claim 
settled so that we could get back to some kind of routine and a family 
life. "55 
Another difficulty arose by 1977. Much of the harmony of 
rebuilding was lost when one neighbor began evaluating another's 
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prosperity. One family may have made a decision to repair its truck 
and tractor, to remodel the house, to replace the outbuildings, but not 
to worry about the fence. A neighbor may have decided to "total" 
everything and start from scratch. So a year later, the neighbor had a 
new house, bam, tractor, pickup, boat, snowmobiles, fences, corrals, 
and even ditches. Both claims were honest, but the claimants had dif-
ferent perspectives. 
In light of this phenomenon, the Associated Press and the Idaho 
Daily Statesman decided to sue the Bureau. Their goal was to publish 
the amount of each person's claim and the total amount that was 
awarded. The purpose behind the suit was to show Bureau incon-
sistency in negotiation as well as attempt to prove that some indi-
viduals had profited by the flood. 56 To date, the government has won 
the suits and has been able to maintain privacy concerning specific 
claims. However, the various cases have continued to be a disruptive 
influence. Those opposed to disclosure argued that the sense of com-
munity would be destroyed by a full revelation of the individual 
amounts. 
It is interesting that so few of the oral histories will discuss the 
claims and their short-and long-term economic impact. The inter-
viewees will go into great detail recalling their every move during and 
after the flood. They willingly talk about their feelings as they 
reentered their disheveled homes and began the process of reconstruc-
tion. With some difficulty, the victims analyze life in the HUD trailers 
or other temporary housing and the complexities of the claims pro-
cess. Yet, they are shy about openly discussing on tape the private mat-
ter of money. Waddy Moore, a past president of the Oral History 
Association stated the dilemma: 
An oral history interview is a poor source for ascertaining the facts or 
even for establishing the chronology of a story. On the other hand. if 
you want to know how the respondent feels about the story. or how he 
or she perceives the event under discussion. or if you are looking for 
interesting and little known details of anecdotal character. then the 
oral history interview is a prize source.'7 
There are many aspects of the Teton Dam story that are unre-
solved. Will the dam be rebuilt? Will the land ever regain its produc-
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tive capacity? Will the claims be published? Will the marking of time 
in the valley return to B.C. and A.D. instead of B.F. and A.F.? 
However, as I have examined the sources and the interviews, it is the 
people who are important to the study. They are central to the story, 
but I am constantly reminded of the conclusion of the late Ruth 
Barrus's interview. She related how a woman from Utah came to their 
testimony meeting and thanked the victims of the flood for their great 
example and related how much their actions were an inspiration. 
Ruth Barrus said, "When I walked out of there I thought , 'we're not 
that good. ' I don't want them to get the feeling ... . We're human and if 
we did rise to a height more than what is normal it was because we had 
a lot of help to do it. "58 Or as Brad Dalling put it , "Please don't make 
us larger than life. We had a job to do and with help, we did it. "59 
Consequently, the Teton Dam flood is both a tragedy and a 
triumph. It is tragic in that a man-made disaster caused dislocation, 
considerable destruction, and death. However, much more impor-
tantly, through volunteerism, government, and religion, it was a story 
of triumph in that a sense of community was maintained. 
Although there are many unique aspects to this incident, the 
significance of the Teton Dam collapse and flood is that man and 
nature must learn to coexist. People must carefully conserve and 
carefully utilize natural resources. The scales are balanced lightly, 
and on occasion, human mistakes can lead to nature's wrath. 
However, as William Faulkner 'said in his Nobel Prize Address, "Man 
will not merely endure; he will prevail. He is immortal not because he 
alone among the creatures has an inexhaustible voice but because he 
has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endur-
ance. " . The writer's duty is to write about these things. It is his 
privilege to help man endure by lifting his heart , by reminding himself 
of the courage and honor and hope and pride and compassion and 
pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of the past. "40 The Teton 
Dam story is ali of these and it , too, will contribute to the glory of our 
past. 
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